USA v. Amirnazmi by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-13-2011 
USA v. Amirnazmi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Amirnazmi" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1174. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1174 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-1198 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ALI AMIRNAZMI, 
          Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Criminal No. 2-08-cr-00429-001 
(Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe) 
______________ 
 
Argued January 11, 2011 
 
Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 13, 2011) 
 
2 
 
ELIZABETH K. AINSLIE, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
VINCENT A. LaMONACA, ESQUIRE 
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis 
1600 Market Street, Suite 3600 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 
 Attorneys for Appellant 
 
BERNADETTE A. McKEON, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
STEPHEN A. MILLER, ESQUIRE 
Office of United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 
 Attorney for Appellee 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 In pursuit of his stated goal of transforming the Islamic 
Republic of Iran into a global chemical powerhouse, Ali 
Amirnazmi, a chemical engineer, marketed a dynamic 
software program to Iranian actors and entered into 
agreements with various Iranian entities in which he pledged 
to provide technology to facilitate the construction of multiple 
chemical plants. Following a jury trial, Amirnazmi was 
convicted on ten charges—four counts stemming from 
violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA), three counts of making false statements, and 
three counts of bank fraud. Amirnazmi moved both for a 
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judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. The District Court 
denied both motions and sentenced him to a four-year prison 
term. We will affirm. 
I. 
 Amirnazmi, a dual citizen of the United States and 
Iran, founded a company called TranTech Consultants, Inc., 
in 1981. Billed as a business geared toward providing “an 
innovative approach to strategic decision making for the 
Chemical Process Industries,” TranTech marketed its primary 
product—a computer software program called ChemPlan—as 
an “exclusive, fully integrated, worldwide database” designed 
to allow chemical companies to assess product viability and 
cost based on a number of variables. ChemPlan had two 
principal functions. As a database that illuminated how 
chemical reactions could be disaggregated into their 
component parts, it included both public information and 
proprietary data derived from Amirnazmi’s expert analysis of 
the various processes.1
                                              
1 ChemPlan’s licensing agreement alerted software 
purchasers to the proprietary nature of the database, 
indicating it contained “valuable TRADE SECRET and 
confidential, unpublished information developed or acquired 
by TranTech at great expense, including data, data structure, 
data processing algorithms, innovations and concepts.”  
 And as a dynamic planning tool, 
ChemPlan enabled end users to determine individualized 
production costs and the feasibility of embarking on 
prospective projects by allowing them to change the input 
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variables in order to generate “what if” scenarios accounting 
for market fluctuations. These features made ChemPlan 
attractive to major manufacturers such as the Dow Chemical 
Company, LyondellBasell Industries, and Rohm and Haas 
Company. 
Aiming to facilitate Iran’s transformation into “an 
independent chemical powerhouse,”2 and seeking to spur “a 
flow of Iranian[ ] [scientists] back to Iran” where he would 
ultimately join them to impart his expertise,3
                                              
2 Letter from Ali Amirnazmi to Mrs. F. Parvaresh, Manager, 
National Petrochemical Company of Iran (April 30, 1998).  
 Amirnazmi 
began, in the mid-1990s, to explore business partnerships 
with Iranian entities. First, he initiated efforts to sell 
ChemPlan to the state-owned National Petrochemical 
Company of Iran (NPC). In August 1997, TranTech and NPC 
executed a Software/Data License Agreement whereby NPC 
agreed to purchase a subscription to ChemPlan for $64,000. 
Amirnazmi directed NPC to wire payment to a European 
bank account, and he traveled to Iran to demonstrate the 
product’s functionality to NPC officials. In 1998, NPC 
purchased a software update for $18,000. In 2000, NPC 
enlisted Amirnazmi’s assistance in its quest to obtain an off-
the-shelf software package called BoxScore, a suite of 
programs manufactured in the United States and consequently 
unavailable to Iranian entities affected by U.S. trade 
3 Email from Amirnazmi to Mr. Robert G. Williamson, 
Attorney at Law (undated).  
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sanctions. Amirnazmi procured the software, sent it to an 
intermediary in Germany, and charged NPC $667.85 for his 
efforts. 
Amirnazmi met in person with NPC personnel at a 
2000 international petrochemical conference held in Iran. 
Thereafter, he sent NPC’s Director of Planning and 
Development a letter in which he encouraged NPC to renew 
its ChemPlan subscription and proposed three options—
including the formation of a joint venture—for tailoring 
ChemPlan to NPC’s unique needs. Amirnazmi attended the 
same conference in 2001 and again attempted to solicit NPC 
interest in a customized ChemPlan package by sending an 
NPC contact several renewed proposals along with 
subscription order forms. 
In 2002, Amirnazmi endeavored to engage an Iranian 
company to handle its advertising and promotional efforts. In 
connection with this deal, Amirnazmi attempted to transfer 
$250 to an Iranian bank account. The U.S. bank declined to 
complete the transaction, and the Treasury Department’s 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) requested from 
Amirnazmi a detailed explanation for this attempted transfer. 
Amirnazmi responded that he had not known such a 
transaction was prohibited by the sanctions then in place 
against Iran.4
                                              
4 OFAC, the arm of the U.S. Treasury Department 
responsible for administering the regulations implementing 
the embargo against Iran, had previously flagged 
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After indicating he was willing to conduct business 
with Iran, Amirnazmi was granted a private audience with 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at an event in New 
York City in September 2006. At this meeting and in 
subsequent correspondence, Amirnazmi expressed his desire 
to transfer ChemPlan’s technical and economic knowledge to 
Iran and sought President Ahmadinejad’s assistance in 
helping him return to Iran so that he might serve the country 
in his “field of expertise.”5 In a January 2007 letter, 
Amirnazmi beseeched President Ahmadinejad to arrange an 
in-person meeting in Tehran so that he might unveil his 
“plan” to help Iran, and he decried the United States’ “cruel 
and tyran[nical]” treatment of the Iranian people.6
Having brought himself to President Ahmadinejad’s 
attention, Amirnazmi’s efforts to improve Iran’s chemical 
  
                                                                                                     
Amirnazmi’s attempt to wire the registration fee for the 2000 
petrochemical conference to an Iranian bank. After 
Amirnazmi’s local bank informed him it could not forward 
funds to a bank owned or controlled by Iranian authorities, 
the conference organizers waived Amirnazmi’s attendance 
fee. 
5 Letter from Amirnazmi to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Nov. 7, 2006).  
6 Fax from Amirnazmi to Ahmadinejad (Jan. 24, 2007) (as 
read from the witness stand by Special Agent Eugene Robert 
Lanzillo, Jr.).  
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capacities began to show results. In December 2007, 
Amirnazmi (on behalf of TranTech) signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the Institute for Business Analysis and 
Consultancy (IBACO), an Iranian company, regarding the 
provision of technology for a proposed polyvinyl butyral 
chemical plant to be constructed in Iran. In May 2008, 
Amirnazmi entered into a separate confidentiality agreement 
with IBACO in which he agreed to have TranTech provide 
software licensing, equipment and chemicals in connection 
with the construction of a glacial acrylic acid and super 
absorbent polymer plant in Iran. 
Amirnazmi and NPC rekindled their working 
partnership in 2008, entering into a new licensing agreement 
for the ChemPlan software. During the negotiations leading 
up to this agreement, Amirnazmi represented that the 1997 
ChemPlan licensing agreement was “still valid.”7
The Memorandum of Understanding with NITD 
expired by its own terms after two months. The 2008 
 And in June 
2008, Amirnazmi entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Nokhbegan Institute of Technology 
Development (NITD), an Iranian company, to create a joint 
venture to provide software, database and technology transfer 
services to clients in the chemical process industry. Under the 
agreement, Amirnazmi pledged to have TranTech transfer the 
ChemPlan system to a newly-formed company in Iran in 
which TranTech would have been the majority shareholder. 
                                              
7 Fax from Amirnazmi to Mr. Gorbanpour, NPC official (Feb. 
26, 2008).  
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licensing agreement with NPC, which was signed by the 
counterparties and which fixed the subscription fee at 
$270,000, was to become effective upon installation of 
ChemPlan on NPC hardware. Amirnazmi twice met with 
IBACO officials in 2008 to negotiate the terms of a formal 
contract covering the polyvinyl butyral plant, but the resulting 
Technology Transfer and Construction Agreement was never 
signed by the parties. And the IBACO confidentiality 
agreement concerning the super absorbent polymer plant 
contemplated further elucidation within the framework of a 
formal contract drafted upon “finalizing negotiation[s] with 
investors.”  
Amirnazmi drew the attention of U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection by traveling to Iran in 2007 and twice more 
in 2008. Customs agents interviewed Amirnazmi upon his 
return to the United States in both April and June of 2008. 
Upon questioning, he claimed both trips were to visit his 
elderly mother and that the latter trip also permitted him to 
attend a petroleum conference. Although Amirnazmi 
repeatedly disavowed any commercial purpose for his travels, 
the presence of ostensibly business-related possessions cast 
doubt on the credibility of his responses. In April he claimed 
the sundry business cards and documents found in his 
briefcase were personal effects he had not made use of on his 
trip. In June 2008, confronted by Customs officials with 
computer files and hard copy documents detailing plans to 
build chemical plants in Iran, he declined to offer an 
explanation.  
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On June 4, 2008, the day after his second encounter 
with Customs officials, Amirnazmi contacted the OFAC 
compliance hotline to inquire in general about U.S. 
restrictions on commercial activity with Iran. Without either 
delving into the specifics of how ChemPlan operated or 
mentioning his prior business dealings with Iranian 
companies, he asked whether making public documents 
available on a website would fall within the informational-
materials exemption to IEEPA and whether exporting an 
unidentified “good” would theoretically require dispensation 
in the form of a license issued by OFAC. 
Two days after this telephone conversation, 
Amirnazmi was questioned by agents from the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He 
acknowledged meeting President Ahmadinejad but denied 
having conducted business on either of his 2008 trips to Iran, 
and he claimed his only two financial transactions with Iran 
had been the disallowed wire transfers much earlier in the 
decade. The agents subsequently obtained a search warrant 
for Amirnazmi’s business. Despite Amirnazmi’s protestations 
that none of the documents named in the warrant were located 
on the premises, the authorities seized numerous physical 
documents and the hard drive from his computer, which also 
contained pertinent documents. Upon further interrogation, 
Amirnazmi conceded he had business relations with NPC 
both in 1997 and in the more recent past, and he 
acknowledged having met with Iranian state officials during 
his trips abroad. 
II. 
10 
 
 On July 24, 2008, the government filed a ten-count 
indictment against Amirnazmi in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania charging him with (1) one count of conspiracy 
to violate IEEPA, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) four 
substantive counts of violating IEEPA, in violation of 50 
U.S.C. § 1705, and of aiding and abetting the same, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2; (3) one count of conspiracy to act 
as an illegal agent of a foreign government, in violation of the 
Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 371; (4) one substantive count of acting as an 
illegal agent of a foreign government, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 951, and of aiding and abetting the same, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (5) three counts of making 
false statements to government officials, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1001. On October 2, the government filed a 
superseding indictment, charging Amirnazmi with three 
additional counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1344, and supplementing the original indictment with further 
factual allegations. 
Prior to trial, Amirnazmi filed a motion to dismiss in 
which he alleged (1) IEEPA regulations are the product of an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the 
Executive; and (2) portions of the superseding indictment 
referencing conduct that occurred more than five years prior 
to the indictment should be barred by the statute of 
limitations. The court denied the motion, concluding IEEPA 
does not violate the nondelegation doctrine and that 
Amirnazmi’s actions prior to 2003 were part of a continuing 
course of conduct that extended into the limitations period 
and contributed to the charged conspiracy. See United States 
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v. Amirnazmi, No. 08-CR-0429-01, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
624 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2009).8
The jury convicted Amirnazmi on all but one of the 
IEEPA counts and on all of the false statement and bank fraud 
counts.
 
9
                                              
8 Also prior to trial, the government moved to admit audio 
recordings and transcripts of certain conversations in which 
Amirnazmi had participated while in pretrial custody. 
Amirnazmi moved to suppress, arguing the government had 
used trial subpoenas to conduct further investigation after the 
indictment had been returned in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 
17(c). The court determined the subpoenas properly directed 
the custodian of records to appear with the documents on 
dates that corresponded with scheduled proceedings in the 
case and consequently allowed the government to admit the 
evidence. 
 Amirnazmi was acquitted of the FARA violations 
charged in Counts Six and Seven. Amirnazmi moved for a 
judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 on the IEEPA 
counts, the false statement counts and one of the bank fraud 
counts. He reiterated his argument that IEEPA 
9 Amirnazmi was found not guilty on Count Three of the 
superseding indictment, which charged him with violating 
IEEPA by entering into an agreement with the Research 
Institute of Petroleum Industry, a division of Iran’s Ministry 
of Petroleum, in which he agreed to conduct negotiations with 
a Danish chemical company for the purpose of establishing a 
joint venture in Iran.  
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unconstitutionally delegates to the Executive authority to 
criminalize commercial conduct, and he added an argument 
that the accompanying OFAC regulations under which he was 
convicted are unconstitutionally vague. He also argued the 
evidence was insufficient to prove his conduct did not fall 
within IEEPA’s informational-materials exemption and that 
the government failed to prove IEEPA required him to obtain 
a license to engage in his activities. The court denied 
Amirnazmi’s motion in its entirety. It rested on its previous 
ruling concerning the nondelegation doctrine, concluded that 
the IEEPA regulations are not unconstitutionally vague, and 
determined the government had produced sufficient evidence 
to sustain each conviction. See United States v. Amirnazmi, 
No. 08-CR-0429-01, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74833 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 21, 2009). 
Amirnazmi also moved for a new trial under Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 33. Amirnazmi reiterated his claims that the prison 
tapes were improperly obtained and should not have been 
admitted and that evidence of his conduct prior to 2003 
should have been barred by the statute of limitations. The 
court denied this motion, resting on its previous ruling with 
respect to the tapes and concluding Amirnazmi’s pre-2003 
actions fell within the scope of his conspiracy “to bring his 
technical wherewithal, especially the ChemPlan system, back 
to Iran for the benefit of that country.” See United States v. 
Amirnazmi, 648 F. Supp. 2d 718, 723 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
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As noted, the District Court sentenced Amirnazmi to a 
48-month term of imprisonment followed by five years’ 
supervised release. Amirnazmi timely appealed.10
III. 
 
On appeal, Amirnazmi principally challenges the 
constitutionality of IEEPA and the accompanying OFAC 
regulations. We will first address the constitutionality of the 
statute itself, which Amirnazmi challenges on two fronts. 
First, he argues that Congress—when delegating the authority 
to create criminal offenses—must articulate the standards by 
which executive conduct will be governed with greater 
precision than is required in the context of delegations of civil 
authority. IEEPA, Amirnazmi contends, lacks the requisite 
specificity. Second, he claims Congress’s failure to comply 
with its statutory responsibility to oversee the implementation 
of the Iranian sanctions regime left the Executive’s discretion 
wholly unchecked. Because IEEPA reserves for Congress the 
final word in determining trade policy during peacetime 
emergencies, Amirnazmi alleges, Congress’s abdication of its 
oversight role rendered the delegation unconstitutional.11
                                              
10 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
11 We review challenges to the constitutionality of a statute de 
novo. United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 151 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
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A. 
 As the source of statutory authority for the Executive’s 
exercise of emergency economic powers in response to 
peacetime crises, IEEPA traces its provenance to § 5(b) of the 
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-91, § 5, 
40 Stat. 411, 415 (1917), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 95a 
(TWEA). Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671 
(1981). TWEA endowed the President with sweeping powers 
to regulate international trade in times of war or “national 
emergency,” but it lacked a countervailing mechanism to 
divest the President of such authority once the emergency had 
ebbed. Because Presidents had displayed a tendency to allow 
“emergency” declarations to linger “even after the 
circumstances or tensions that had led to the declaration could 
no longer be said to pose a threat of emergency proportion to 
the Nation,” some expressed concern that TWEA effectively 
served as a “one-way ratchet to enhance greatly the 
President’s discretionary authority over foreign policy.” 
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 245 (1984) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting).  
 In an effort to address TWEA’s evolution into a 
“flexible instrument of foreign policy in nonemergency 
situations,” id. at 246, Congress amended § 5(b) in 1977, 
restricting the Executive’s ability to act under that statute 
strictly to times of war, Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. I, § 101, 91 
Stat. 1625, 1625 (1977) (striking “or during any other period 
of national emergency declared by the President” from the 
text of § 5(b)). Contemporaneously, Congress enacted the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act to serve as 
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the locus of executive economic authority during national-
emergency situations. See id. at Tit. II, 91 Stat. at 1626 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.). Although the powers 
conferred in IEEPA closely mirror those granted in its 
progenitor, IEEPA removed certain tools from the President’s 
peacetime kit.12 And, significantly for our purposes, IEEPA 
subjected the President’s authority to a host of procedural 
limitations designed to ensure Congress would retain its 
essential legislative superiority in the formulation of sanctions 
regimes erected under the Act’s delegation of emergency 
power.13
The predicate for an exercise of executive authority 
under IEEPA is the declaration of a national emergency under 
the National Emergencies Act (NEA). See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 
1701(b). Under IEEPA, the emergency must stem from an 
“unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in 
whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the 
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United 
States.” Id. § 1701(a). After declaring such an emergency, the 
 
                                              
12 Unlike TWEA, IEEPA does not authorize the Executive to 
take title to foreign assets, to regulate purely domestic 
transactions, to regulate gold or bullion, or to seize records. 
See Regan, 468 U.S. at 228 n.8. 
13 As explained at greater length in Section III.C.2 infra, 
Congress’s reservation of a stricter oversight role in IEEPA is 
relevant to Amirnazmi’s separation-of-powers argument.   
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President may, through “regulations . . . instructions, licenses, 
or otherwise,” 
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit — 
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange, 
(ii) transfers of credit or payments 
between, by, through, or to any banking 
institution, to the extent that such 
transfers or payments involve any 
interest of any foreign country or a 
national thereof, 
(iii) the importing or exporting of 
currency or securities, 
by any person, or with respect to any property, 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; 
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an 
investigation, regulate, direct and compel, 
nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any 
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, 
withdrawal, transportation, importation or 
exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any 
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or 
transactions involving, any property in which 
any foreign country or a national thereof has 
any interest by any person, or with respect to 
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States . . . . 
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Id. § 1702(a)(1). 
In tandem, IEEPA and NEA subject the President’s 
exercise of emergency economic powers to an assortment of 
procedural requirements. The President must consult with 
Congress before exercising any of his powers under IEEPA 
“in every possible instance,” and he “shall consult regularly 
with the Congress so long as such authorities are exercised.” 
Id. § 1703(a); see also id. § 1703(c) (stipulating that the 
President must report to Congress “[a]t least once during each 
succeeding six-month period after” the initial exercise of any 
authority granted by the IEEPA). Whenever the President acts 
pursuant to IEEPA, he must provide Congress with a report 
detailing: 
(1) the circumstances which necessitate such 
exercise of authority; 
(2) why the President believes those 
circumstances constitute an unusual and 
extraordinary threat, which has its source in 
whole or substantial part outside the United 
States, to the national security, foreign policy, 
or economy of the United States; 
(3) the authorities to be exercised and the 
actions to be taken in the exercise of those 
authorities to deal with those circumstances; 
(4) why the President believes such actions are 
necessary to deal with those circumstances; and 
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(5) any foreign countries with respect to which 
such actions are to be taken and why such 
actions are to be taken with respect to those 
countries. 
Id. § 1703(b). After each six-month interval, Congress “shall 
meet to consider a vote on a joint resolution to determine 
whether that emergency shall be terminated.” Id. § 1622(b); 
id. § 1706(b) (providing for the cessation of presidential 
authority under IEEPA upon congressional termination of an 
emergency declared under NEA). 
Substantively, the regulations contain several 
exemptions and constraints. That is, regulations promulgated 
under IEEPA may not impinge upon transactions incident to 
travel or curtail the free exchange of personal 
communications, humanitarian aid, or “information or 
informational materials.” Id. § 1702(b). Moreover, criminal 
penalties under IEEPA are reserved exclusively for those who 
“willfully commit[ ], willfully attempt[ ] to commit, or 
willfully conspire[ ] to commit” a violation of any license, 
order or regulation issued pursuant to IEEPA. Id. § 1705(c). 
And the Act exempts those who act in “good faith” reliance 
on IEEPA, or on “any regulation, instruction, or direction” 
issued under IEEPA, from both civil and criminal liability. Id. 
§ 1702(a)(3). 
 On March 15, 1995, President Bill Clinton issued 
Executive Order 12957, which declared a national emergency 
to deal with the “unusual and extraordinary threat” posed to 
the national security, foreign policy and economy of the 
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United States by “the actions and policies of the Government 
of Iran,” and which prohibited United States involvement 
with petroleum development in Iran. 60 Fed. Reg. 14615 
(Mar. 17, 1995).14
Subject to limited exemptions and to licenses issued by 
OFAC, the ITR prohibits, in part, the “exportation, 
reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the 
United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, 
of any goods, technology, or services to Iran or the 
Government of Iran,” 31 C.F.R. § 560.204, and “any new 
investment by a United States person in Iran or in property 
 On May 6, 1995, President Clinton signed 
Executive Order 12959, which fortified the sanctions regime 
by banning U.S. firms from exporting to Iran, importing from 
Iran, or investing in Iran, subject to the exemptions provided 
in IEEPA. See 60 Fed. Reg. 24757 (May 9, 1995); see also 
Exec. Order No. 13059, 62 Fed. Reg. 44531 (Aug. 21, 1997) 
(clarifying the preceding Orders). The Executive Orders 
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, “to take such actions, including the 
promulgation of rules and regulations . . . as may be 
necessary to carry out the purposes” of the Orders. See, e.g., 
60 Fed. Reg. 14615 at § 3. The Treasury Department 
subsequently issued the Iranian Transactions Regulations 
(ITR). See generally 31 C.F.R. Part 560.  
                                              
14 The national emergency with respect to Iran has been 
extended annually through presidential notices. See Executive 
Documents summarized in the annotations to 50 U.S.C. § 
1701. 
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(including entities) owned or controlled by the Government 
of Iran,” id. § 560.207; see also id. § 560.206(a) (generally 
prohibiting “any transaction or dealing in or related to . . . 
[g]oods, technology, or services for exportation, 
reexportation, sale or supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran or 
the Government of Iran”).15
B. 
 The regulations also incorporate 
the statutory exemption permitting the exportation of 
“informational materials.” Id. § 560.210(c). Critically, this 
exemption does not apply to informational materials “not 
fully created and in existence at the date of the transactions, 
or to the substantive or artistic alteration or enhancement of 
informational materials.” Id. 
                                              
15 OFAC authorizes otherwise proscribed transactions 
through general licenses set forth in the ITR and through 
specific licenses issued pursuant to the procedures outlined in 
31 C.F.R. Part 560, Subpart E. Whereas a general license 
categorically authorizes “a particular type of transaction for a 
class of persons without the need to apply for a license,” a 
specific license is a “written document issued by OFAC to a 
particular person or entity, authorizing a particular transaction 
in response to a written license application.” OFAC, 
Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx (last visited April 
29, 2011). 
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 The maxim that Congress may not delegate legislative 
power to the President is “universally recognized as vital to 
the integrity and maintenance of the system of government 
ordained by the Constitution.” Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 
692 (1892). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has invoked the 
unconstitutional delegation doctrine—which derives its 
constitutional underpinning from Article I’s vesting of “all 
legislative powers” with Congress16
                                              
16 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. 
—to strike down a law 
only twice in its history. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 
U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating delegation under section 9(c) of 
the National Industrial Recovery Act permitting the President 
to prohibit the interstate transportation of petroleum goods); 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935) (striking down section 3 of the same Act, which 
authorized trade and industrial associations to propose “codes 
of fair competition” that would become legally binding if 
approved by the President). The Court’s jurisprudence has 
been animated by a “practical understanding that in our 
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and 
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 
(1989). Accordingly, in assessing a permissible delegation, 
the Court has decreed it will be “‘constitutionally sufficient if 
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public 
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this 
delegated authority.’” Id. at 372-73 (quoting Am. Power & 
Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).  
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Congress’s ability to endow a coordinate branch of 
government with a measure of discretion is circumscribed by 
the requirement that it must “lay down by legislative act an 
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized 
to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.” 
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928). Whereas Congress must itself elucidate “the standards 
of legal obligation” in order to fulfill its “essential legislative 
function,” it may devolve to “selected instrumentalities 
[responsibility for] the making of subordinate rules within 
prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the 
policy as declared by the legislature is to apply.” Schechter 
Poultry, 295 U.S. at 530. Because no one standard can 
account for the range of contexts in which Congress 
legislates, “the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable 
varies according to the scope of the power congressionally 
conferred.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 
457, 475 (2001).  
The Supreme Court has upheld Congress’s delegation 
to the President of civil authority to nullify certain 
attachments and transfers of assets under IEEPA. Dames & 
Moore, 453 U.S. at 675. But Amirnazmi contends IEEPA’s 
delegation of authority to define criminal conduct is 
inherently more suspect and that, consequently, only a lesser 
degree of executive discretion is constitutionally permissible 
in this context. The Court has expressly refrained from 
deciding whether Congress must provide stricter guidance 
than a mere “intelligible principle” when authorizing the 
Executive “to promulgate regulations that contemplate 
criminal sanctions.” Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 
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165-66 (1991). After concluding the contested delegation 
would pass constitutional muster even under a heightened 
standard, the Court refrained from resolving the petitioner’s 
argument that criminal regulations promulgated under 
congressional delegations of authority should be subject to 
more searching scrutiny on account of the “heightened risk to 
individual liberty” they pose. Id. at 166.17
C. 
 
                                              
17 In Touby, the Court held section 201(h) of the Controlled 
Substances Act, which delegated to the Attorney General the 
authority to temporarily designate a substance as “controlled” 
without submitting to the full complement of procedural 
requirements for permanent scheduling, “meaningfully 
constrain[ed] the Attorney General’s discretion to define 
criminal conduct.” Id. at 166. The Court pointed to “multiple 
specific restrictions on the Attorney General’s discretion” 
that, together, satisfied the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 167. 
To schedule a drug temporarily, the Attorney General was 
required to find that doing so would be “necessary to avoid an 
imminent hazard to the public safety.” Id. at 166 (citing 21 
U.S.C. § 811(h)(1)). In rendering this determination, the 
Attorney General was “required to consider” three specific 
factors, ordered to publish 30-day notice of the proposed 
scheduling in the Federal Register and to transmit notice to 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and bound by 
several of the strictures for permanent scheduling (“high 
potential for abuse,” “no currently accepted medical use”). Id. 
at 166-67. 
24 
 
1. 
Two of our sister circuits have analyzed IEEPA’s 
delegation of authority to criminalize conduct in light of 
Touby and have concluded the Act withstands constitutional 
scrutiny. In United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 
1087, 1092-94 (4th Cir. 1993), the Fourth Circuit discerned 
“constraining factors” in IEEPA comparable to those found 
sufficient in Touby and concluded the President’s powers are 
“explicitly defined and circumscribed.” And in United States 
v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2006), the Second 
Circuit adopted the Fourth Circuit’s logic, concluding IEEPA 
would satisfy even a heightened standard because “the 
authorities delegated are defined and limited.”18
We too conclude that IEEPA “meaningfully 
constrains” the President’s discretion. See Touby, 500 U.S. at 
166. Under the Controlled Substance Act provision examined 
in Touby, the Attorney General could not temporarily 
schedule a drug without first finding that doing so would be 
“necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety.” 
Id. Similarly, to activate IEEPA, the President must find that 
an “unusual and extraordinary threat . . . to the national 
 
                                              
18 District Courts have followed suit. See United States v. 
Mirza, No. H-06-421, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34556, at *3-4 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2010); United States v. Esfahani, No. 05-
CR-0255, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1839, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 17, 2006); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. 
Supp. 2d 821, 829-30 (N.D. Ohio 2005). 
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security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States” 
originating on foreign soil has reached “national emergency” 
proportions. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701. In Touby, the Court found 
the Attorney General was constrained by the requirement that 
he abide by several of the more rigorous features of the 
permanent scheduling process designating illegal drugs. 500 
U.S. at 166-67. Likewise, IEEPA prohibits the President from 
regulating certain exempt transactions, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b), 
from prosecuting unwitting violators or holding liable those 
who act in good faith reliance on the statute and regulations, 
id. §§ 1705(c), 1702(a)(3), and from obviating Congress’s 
role as ultimate arbiter of emergency trade policy, see id. §§ 
1622(b), 1703, 1706;19
In effecting the shift of peacetime authority from 
TWEA to IEEPA, Congress “placed several procedural 
restrictions on the President’s exercise of the national-
emergency powers, including congressional consultation, 
review, and termination.” Regan, 468 U.S. at 249 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). In so doing, Congress reaffirmed its “essential 
legislative function,” see Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 530, 
and struck a careful balance between affording the President a 
degree of authority to address the exigencies of national 
emergencies and restraining his ability to perpetuate 
 see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73 
(explaining Congress must “clearly delineate[ ] the general 
policy . . . and the boundaries of this delegated authority”).  
                                              
19 The Constitution vests the power to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations in the hands of Congress. U.S. Const. art. 
I, § 8. 
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emergency situations indefinitely by creating more 
opportunities for congressional input, cf. Panama Ref. Co., 
293 U.S. at 430 (“Congress has declared no policy, has 
established no standard, has laid down no rule”).20
2. 
 Therefore, 
IEEPA meets the same standard of constraint outlined in 
Touby; that is, IEEPA meaningfully constrains the 
Executive’s discretion. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for us 
to address the unsettled question of whether something more 
demanding than an “intelligible principle” is necessitated 
within the context of delegating authority to define criminal 
conduct.  
Second, Amirnazmi claims Congress has violated 
fundamental separation-of-powers precepts by neglecting its 
statutory responsibility to monitor the implementation of the 
                                              
20 Amirnazmi unconvincingly attempts to distinguish Touby 
by arguing the power to classify newly designed drugs is “far 
narrower” than the powers conferred by the IEEPA. The 
petitioner in Dhafir raised a similar argument, contending the 
Touby court upheld a “temporary power” to schedule 
controlled substances whereas IEEPA confers authority that 
can persist indefinitely. 461 F.3d at 217. The Second Circuit 
rejected this position, pointing to the need for the President to 
reaffirm the national emergency at regular intervals and 
Congress’s ability to terminate the declaration as indicia of 
proper limitation. Id. We find no material durational 
difference between the delegations at issue here and in Touby. 
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Iranian sanctions regime established under IEEPA. In so 
doing, Amirnazmi claims, the legislature has allowed the 
President to arrogate “virtually unlimited power over foreign 
trade,” thereby fomenting a “serious threat to public liberty 
[that] necessitates judicial intervention.” This allegation 
implicates interrelated issues of foreign policy, congressional 
authorization, and statutorily mandated oversight. Because 
these considerations are intertwined, we consider them in 
concert.  
The linchpin of Amirnazmi’s claim is 50 U.S.C. § 
1622(b), which reads: “Not later than six months after a 
national emergency is declared, and not later than the end of 
each six-month period thereafter that such emergency 
continues, each House of Congress shall meet to consider a 
vote on a joint resolution to determine whether that 
emergency shall be terminated.” In Dhafir, the Second Circuit 
noted in passing that Congress’s failure to fulfill its oversight 
responsibilities might conceivably raise “complicated and 
sensitive issues concerning separation of powers” but 
declined to expound in light of an inadequate factual record. 
461 F.3d at 217 n.3. Given the conventional wisdom that the 
shift in authority from TWEA to IEEPA was inspired in part 
by a prevailing sentiment that Congress’s role in devising 
emergency trade policy warranted strengthening, see supra 
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Section III.A, its failure to police executive conduct would 
appear counterintuitive.21
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether a 
national emergency properly declared under NEA terminates 
automatically when Congress fails to meet in conformance 
with the language of § 1622(b). In Beacon Products Corp. v. 
Reagan, 814 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1987), the First Circuit 
answered that question in the negative. The court reasoned 
that the disparity between § 1622(d), which explicitly 
provides for the automatic termination of a national 
emergency should the President fail to extend it, and § 
1622(b), which is devoid of a parallel congressional 
provision, suggests Congress deliberately withheld automatic 
termination as a remedy for violation of the “periodic 
meeting” clause. Id. at 4. Next, the court noted Congress 
eliminated a sunset provision from an earlier draft of NEA, 
reserving for itself “the burden of acting affirmatively” by 
substituting in that provision’s place the requirement that it 
pass a resolution to end an emergency. Id. (referencing 50 
U.S.C. § 1622(a)). The court then concluded Congress likely 
intended “to give those who want to end the emergency the 
chance to force a vote on the issue, rather than to require 
those who do not want to end the emergency to force 
congressional action to prevent automatic termination.” Id. at 
5. We agree that Congress did not effectively terminate the 
 
                                              
21 The parties agree that Congress has not met regularly to 
consider terminating the national emergency with respect to 
Iran. 
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emergency against Iran simply by virtue of its failure to hold 
the periodic meetings addressed in § 1622(b). 
Amirnazmi contends Beacon Products should not 
control our analysis because the issue here is not merely one 
of statutory interpretation but instead one that requires us to 
consider whether Congress’s failure to regularly convene to 
evaluate the desirability of a continued emergency trade 
regime violates the power-sharing program contemplated by 
IEEPA. That is, Amirnazmi would have us hold that 
Congress’s assumption of a silent partner role transforms a 
limited delegation into a blank check that confers upon the 
Executive unbridled power to create trade policy. In Dames v. 
Moore, the Court wrote that IEEPA “constitutes specific 
congressional authorization to the President” to take certain 
emergency measures. 453 U.S. at 675. Following 
Amirnazmi’s logic, the issue would then become whether 
protracted inaction vitiates this authorization. If this were the 
case, we would likely consider whether, after express 
authorization has ostensibly lapsed, the President’s continued 
criminalization of certain commercial conduct has either been 
implicitly countenanced or whether he is in fact acting 
pursuant to some form of inherent authority.  
 The constitutionality of IEEPA’s delegation of 
criminal authority does not rest on Congress affirmatively 
renewing its approval of each ongoing emergency at regular 
six-month intervals. Equating inaction with a withdrawal of 
authorization would be particularly improper with a statute 
that concerns foreign affairs, “a sphere in which delegation is 
afforded even broader deference.” Dhafir, 461 F.3d at 215. 
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“Congress—in giving the Executive authority over matters of 
foreign affairs—must of necessity paint with a brush broader 
than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.” Zemel v. 
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); see also Veterans & Reservists 
for Peace in Vietnam v. Reg. Comm’r of Customs, 459 F.2d 
676, 679 (3d Cir. 1972) (“Ordinarily, when dealing with 
matters of foreign relations, Congress may lawfully delegate 
to the President broader discretion than would be permissible 
with regard to domestic affairs.”); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (upholding 
Congress’s ability to delegate the power to prohibit the sale of 
arms to certain countries designated by the President and 
explaining that it was “important to bear in mind that we are 
here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the 
President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such 
an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive 
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations”). Mindful 
of the heightened deference accorded the Executive in this 
field, we decline to interpret the legislative grant of authority 
parsimoniously. Congress may act to terminate the national 
emergency; NEA does not necessarily compel Congress to 
take affirmative steps to prolong the President’s charted 
course. See Beacon Prods., 814 F.2d at 4; 50 U.S.C. § 1622.  
Congress’s failure to satisfy the periodic meeting 
requirements of § 1622(b) does not ineluctably lead to a 
conclusion that the President’s continued prosecution of trade 
sanctions under IEEPA has ceased to be “pursuant to an 
express or implied authorization.” See Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
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concurring) (setting forth the familiar tripartite framework for 
evaluating executive action and explaining the President’s 
power is “at its maximum” when he acts according to 
congressional directive). In Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300-
01 (1981), the Court inferred congressional approval of a 
“longstanding and officially promulgated” executive policy 
from both inaction and statutory developments that “‘left 
completely untouched the broad rule-making authority 
granted in the earlier Act.’” Id. (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 
12). Under Agee, we must generally defer to a consistent 
administrative construction of a statute. Id. at 291. “This is 
especially so in the areas of foreign policy and national 
security, where congressional silence is not to be equated 
with congressional disapproval.” Id. The Court’s analysis in 
Agee was buttressed by its determination that Congress had 
“endorsed not only the underlying premise of Executive 
authority in the areas of foreign policy and national security, 
but also its specific application” to the subject matter at issue. 
Id. at 294.  
Similarly, this regulatory embargo against Iran has 
been in place since 1995. Far from sitting by as successive 
Presidents maintained a sweeping sanctions regime, Congress 
has expanded, deepened and formalized the sanctions in a 
comprehensive legislative effort to target Iran through 
economic measures. In 1996, Congress passed the Iran 
Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996) 
(codified in part at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (note)), which mandated 
the imposition of specified sanctions against foreign firms 
that reached threshold levels of involvement with Iran’s 
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energy sector.22
United States sanctions with respect to Iran 
imposed pursuant to sections 1 and 3 of 
Executive Order No. 12957, sections 1(e), 
(1)(g) and (3) of Executive Order No. 12959, 
 Subsequently, in 2006, Congress passed the 
Iran Freedom Support Act. Pub L. No. 109-293, 120 Stat. 
1344 (2006) (codified in part at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (note)). In 
addition to appropriating funds earmarked for the support of 
persons and organizations “working for the purpose of 
supporting and promoting democracy for Iran,” id. § 302, the 
Act placed Congress’s imprimatur on executive sanctions 
against Iran. Under the heading “Codification of Sanctions,” 
Congress wrote: 
                                              
22 See id. at § 3 (“The Congress declares that it is the policy of 
the United States to deny Iran the ability to support acts of 
international terrorism and to fund the development and 
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means to 
deliver them by limiting the development of Iran’s ability to 
explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum 
resources of Iran.”). Iran has been designated a state sponsor 
of terrorism continuously since January 19, 1984. Prevatt v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F. Supp. 2d 152, 156 (D.D.C. 
2006). This classification has restricted the flow of goods into 
Iran under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App’x § 2405(j)), section 620A 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2371), and sections 38 and 40 of the Arms Export Control 
Act (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2780). 
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and sections 2, 3, and 5 of Executive Order No. 
13059 (relating to exports and certain other 
transactions with Iran) as in effect on January 1, 
2006, shall remain in effect. The President may 
terminate such sanctions, in whole or in part, if 
the President notifies Congress at least 15 days 
in advance of such termination. 
Id. at § 101(a). Notably, one of the provisions incorporated by 
reference (section 2 of Executive Order 13059) specifically 
prohibited “the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, 
directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United 
States person, wherever located, of any goods, technology, or 
services to Iran or the Government of Iran.” 62 Fed. Reg. 
44531.  
And in 2010, Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010. Pub. 
L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010) (codified in part at 50 
U.S.C § 1701 (note)). CISADA expanded the Iran Sanctions 
Act by targeting Iran’s ability to make or import gasoline and 
placing new restrictions on financial institutions. Id. Most 
significantly for our purposes, however, is § 103(b)(2), in 
which Congress codified the prohibitions on the exportation 
of goods, services and technology of United States origin to 
Iran that were then in effect under executive orders 
promulgated pursuant to IEEPA. Id. at Tit. I, § 103, 124 Stat. 
at 1328-31.23
                                              
23 CISADA incorporated the exemptions provided in 50 
U.S.C. § 1702(b), including the informational-materials 
 Therefore, when Amirnazmi was tried and 
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convicted, Congress had already ratified the OFAC 
regulations under which he was charged. And, in the 
aftermath of his conviction, Congress once more manifested 
its approval of executive conduct by again codifying the 
extant prohibitions on exports issued pursuant to IEEPA. 
These measures demonstrate Congress’s approval of the 
emergency measures undertaken against Iran notwithstanding 
its failure to adhere to the meeting requirements of § 
1622(b).24
Far from being unaware or indifferent, in the case of 
Iran, Congress has clearly and consistently demonstrated its 
support of the Executive’s agenda. This is not a scenario in 
which we are compelled to divine the significance—if any—
of congressional silence. Nevertheless, given the number of 
countries against which trade sanctions have been leveled 
  
                                                                                                     
exemption, into this blanket codification. Pub. L. No. 111-195 
at Tit. I, § 103(b)(2)(B)(i), 124 Stat. at 1328-29. 
24 Unsurprisingly, Congress’s enactment of legislative 
sanctions against Iran coincided with its eschewing of 
periodic meetings to review the Executive’s IEEPA-based 
sanctions. This reality corroborates the First Circuit’s 
supposition in Beacon Products that “[f]ailure to vote likely 
means that few legislators wish to end the emergency. It 
would be odd to think that Congress would make it easier to 
terminate a popular emergency than an unpopular one.” 814 
F.2d at 4-5. 
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pursuant to IEEPA,25 it is not difficult to envisage a situation 
in which Congress’s position is less robustly documented. 
Although Congress’s failure to periodically meet neither 
automatically terminates an emergency nor bespeaks its 
dissatisfaction with the President’s policies, § 1622(b) 
provides a regularized mechanism for disquieted 
representatives to initiate a dialogue about or even contest the 
wisdom of continuing on with the President’s strategy. Once 
the President has invoked his power to criminalize certain 
conduct under IEEPA, Congress retains an ongoing part in 
ensuring the Executive’s actions remain “meaningfully 
constrained” so as to satisfy the requirements of Touby.26
                                              
25 Since the statute’s inception, Presidents have found 
“unusual and extraordinary” threats emanating from 
Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus, Burma, Colombia, Cote 
d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Iran, 
Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Nicaragua, North Korea, Panama, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Syria, the Western Balkans, and 
Zimbabwe. See Executive Documents summarized in the 
annotations to 50 U.S.C. § 1701.  
 
26 Originally, NEA provided for termination of an emergency 
state by “concurrent resolution” of Congress. See Beacon 
Products v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (D. Mass. 
1986) (citing the first iteration of 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a)). 
However, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983), the 
Supreme Court invalidated a similar provision as an 
unconstitutional “legislative veto” insofar as it allowed 
Congress to act without obtaining the President’s signature. 
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The Supreme Court has held that “[m]atters intimately 
related to foreign policy and national security are rarely 
proper subjects for judicial intervention,” Agee, 453 U.S. at 
292, and federal courts have historically declined to review 
“the essentially political questions surrounding the 
declaration or continuance of a national emergency,” United 
States v. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 685 F.2d 1076, 1080 
(9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although 
such considerations do not preclude enforcing compliance 
with statutory dictates, NEA places the onus on Congress to 
ensure emergency situations remain anomalous and do not 
quietly evolve into default norms. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. 
at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[P]ower to legislate for 
emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only 
                                                                                                     
Subsequently, Congress amended NEA and the 
unconstitutional clause with one that called for termination of 
an emergency by “joint resolution.” Pub. L. No. 99-93, Tit. 
VIII, § 801, 99 Stat. 405, 448 (1985) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 
1622 by striking each use of the word “concurrent” and 
inserting in its place the word “joint”). IEEPA, on its face, 
permits a national emergency to be “terminated by the 
Congress by concurrent resolution pursuant to section 202 of 
the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C. § 1622].” See 50 
U.S.C. § 1706(b) (2011). Chadha and the amendment to the 
cross-referenced section in NEA would appear to have 
rendered the words “by concurrent resolution” in § 1706(b) 
ineffective. “[P]ursuant to section 202 of the National 
Emergencies Act,” Congress may only terminate an 
emergency via joint resolution.  
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Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its 
fingers.”). 
IV. 
Next, Amirnazmi argues the government failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ChemPlan does not fall 
within the scope of IEEPA’s informational-materials 
exemption. He contends that Congress intended to insulate 
transactions incident to the free flow of information from 
regulation and that the sale of ChemPlan, which conveys 
pricing information and scientific information, falls within 
this category of presumptively exempt activity. He urges us to 
vacate his convictions on Counts Two and Five of the 
superseding indictment, which charged him with ChemPlan-
related IEEPA violations, because, he argues, OFAC’s 
interpretation of this exemption both flouts congressional 
intent and is unconstitutionally vague. 
Congress proscribes the Executive from regulating, 
pursuant to IEEPA, 
the importation from any country, or the 
exportation to any country, whether commercial 
or otherwise, regardless of format or medium of 
transmission, of any information or 
informational materials, including but not 
limited to, publications, films, posters, 
phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, 
microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, 
artworks, and news wire feeds . . . . 
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50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3). OFAC has incorporated the statutory 
exemption into the ITR; the regulations provide a general 
license authorizing transactions involving “information and 
informational materials.” See 31 C.F.R. § 560.210(c)(1). 
Although not enumerated in the statute, technology and 
software are capable of qualifying as “informational 
materials” under the regulations. See id. § 560.418 (“The 
release of technology or software in the United States . . . to 
any person violates the [ITR] if made with knowledge or 
reason to know the technology is intended for Iran or the 
Government of Iran, unless that technology or software meets 
the definition of information and informational materials in § 
560.315.”). However, under OFAC’s interpretation, the 
general license is not applicable to “transactions related to 
information and informational materials not fully created and 
in existence at the date of the transactions, or to the 
substantive or artistic alteration or enhancement of 
informational materials, or to the provision of marketing and 
business consulting services.” Id. § 560.210(c)(2) (emphasis 
added). 
At trial, the parties agreed to submit the issue of 
whether ChemPlan fell within the exemption to the jury as a 
factual matter, and the jury was instructed that the 
government had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt the exemption did not apply. In his Rule 29 motion, 
Amirnazmi appeared to challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his conviction on the IEEPA counts. The 
District Court, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government, concluded a reasonable 
factfinder could have found the government had proven 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that ChemPlan was “not fully 
created and in existence at the date of the [relevant] 
transactions” and thus could have found the informational-
materials exemption inapplicable. Amirnazmi, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 74833, at *18. In reaching this conclusion, the District 
Court cited Amirnazmi’s description of ChemPlan as a 
“dynamic tool, which allows the user to generate ‘what if’ 
scenarios,” as well as testimony indicating that ChemPlan 
packages were specifically tailored to end users and that the 
program allowed users to enter their own data in order to 
generate customized reports. 
Ordinarily, our review of whether a jury verdict rests 
on legally sufficient evidence is “particularly deferential.” 
United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). We 
must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Government . . . and will sustain the verdict if any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The government argues Amirnazmi has 
waived any claim that the exemption applies as a matter of 
law by accepting the proposed jury instruction. See United 
States ex rel. O’Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632, 634 n.2 
(3d Cir. 1969) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
(1938) (defining a waiver as “an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege”)).  
But because the jury returned a guilty verdict without 
specific interrogatories, we cannot say with any certainty 
whether it concluded ChemPlan simply did not qualify as 
“informational materials” or whether, as the District Court 
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surmised, it concluded the exemption was inapplicable on 
account of the regulatory carve-out. In federal criminal cases, 
a general verdict will be upheld if the government has 
adduced sufficient evidence in support of at least one of the 
alternative theories on which the jury was charged. Griffin v. 
United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49 (1991).27 We agree with the 
District Court that a reasonable factfinder could have found 
the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
ChemPlan was “not fully created and in existence at the date 
of the transactions,” and was therefore subject to OFAC 
regulation under the ITR.28
                                              
27 In its jury charge, the District Court quoted both IEEPA’s 
informational-materials exemption and the regulatory carve-
out within the ITR. It then stressed that “the defendant has 
raised this [informational-materials] exemption as an issue 
during trial. The government has the burden to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the exemption does not apply.” 
 
28 We will thus assume without deciding that the ChemPlan 
software could conceivably satisfy the definition of 
“information and informational materials” in 31 C.F.R. § 
560.315. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.418. Nevertheless, it bears 
noting that OFAC has consistently treated software as 
conceptually distinct from other forms of informational 
materials. See id. § 560.210(c)(3) (“This section does not 
exempt from regulation or authorize transactions incident to 
the exportation of software subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-774).”); id. § 
560.210(c)(4) (“This section does not exempt from regulation 
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 Amirnazmi argues reliance on this regulatory language 
is fatally misplaced for two reasons. First, he claims OFAC’s 
interpretation of the informational-materials exemption is 
ultra vires. As Congress has structured IEEPA to disempower 
the Executive from imposing trade sanctions that impinge 
upon certain conduct, he argues, a regulation that undercuts 
this legislative charge by purporting to criminalize such 
conduct would be unenforceable. Second, he argues this 
regulation fails to inform those potentially affected by IEEPA 
that certain conduct is proscribed. Because the regulation did 
not announce with unmistakable clarity that a product of 
ChemPlan’s nature would not fall within the general license 
for “informational materials,” he contends, it is 
unconstitutionally vague.  
A. 
First, Amirnazmi contends OFAC’s regulation 
removing informational materials “not fully created and in 
existence at the date of the transactions” from the scope of the 
statutory exemption reflects an impermissible agency 
interpretation that should be struck down under the principles 
enunciated in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). We disagree. 
                                                                                                     
or authorize the exportation of goods (including software) . . . 
where such exportation . . . is for use in the transmission of 
any data.”).   
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Prior to 1988, trade sanctions that hampered the 
exchange of informational materials were routinely justified 
under TWEA and IEEPA as incidental to the broader 
commercial purpose of these trade measures. See, e.g., 
Teague v. Regional Comm’r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441, 445 
(2d Cir. 1968) (upholding TWEA regulations that effected a 
categorical prohibition on importation of informational 
materials from China, North Korea and North Vietnam 
because the limitation was “incidental to the proper general 
purpose of the regulations: restricting the dollar flow to 
hostile nations”). In Veterans & Reservists for Peace in 
Vietnam, we wrote: 
[A] statute is not overly broad and thus 
violative of the First Amendment merely 
because it regulates incident to its scheme 
protected activities or property. It is only where 
the statute directly regulates speech or 
expression arguably protected by the First 
Amendment, or where as its mechanism the 
statute has granted discretion to a delegatee to 
determine whether particular items of 
expression may be prohibited on the basis of 
their content, that the question of overbreadth 
arises. [TWEA] Section 5(b) does not directly 
regulate First Amendment protected material, 
rather it controls transactions concerning 
property in which an enemy has an economic 
interest. The purport of the statute is clear on its 
face, and therefore provides guidance to the 
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delegatee with regard to the exercise of his 
functions.  
459 F.2d at 681. Until 1988, this line of reasoning held sway. 
The regulations “nominally allowed the importation of 
informational materials . . . but in reality banned it by 
requiring that the importers make payment into blocked U.S. 
accounts.” Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (citing 31 C.F.R. § 515.545 (1987)). 
 Congress amended section 5 of TWEA and section 
203(b) of IEEPA in 1988 to exempt the regulation of 
informational materials from the Executive’s congeries of 
powers. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2502, 102 Stat. 1107, 1371 
(1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 
1072(b)).29
                                              
29 The amendment restricted the Executive from regulating or 
prohibiting, directly or indirectly,  
 The amendment specifically removed from the 
the importation from any country, or the 
exportation to any country, whether commercial 
or otherwise, of publications, films, posters, 
phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, 
microfiche, tapes, or other informational 
materials, which are not otherwise controlled 
for export under section 5 of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 or with respect to 
which no acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of 
title 18, United States Code. 
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Executive’s purview the authority to regulate or prohibit such 
transactions “directly or indirectly.” Id. This Berman 
Amendment was considered “a reaction to several seizures by 
the United States of shipments of magazines and books from 
embargoed countries and to the Treasury Department’s 
restrictions on the permissible forms of payment for 
informational materials purchased from Cuba.” Kalantari v. 
NITV, Inc., 352 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2003) (footnotes 
omitted).  
In the wake of the Berman Amendment, OFAC 
amended its regulations to conform with the new statutory 
language. See Foreign Assets Control Regulations and Cuban 
Assets Control Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 5229 (Feb. 2, 1989) 
(codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.206, 500.332). Paralleling the 
statute, the new regulations exempted informational 
materials, “whether commercial or otherwise,” from 
prohibition or regulation. Id. Notably, however, OFAC took a 
narrow view of what constituted “informational materials.” 
From the outset, OFAC reserved the right to regulate 
transactions related to “informational materials not fully 
created and in existence at the date of the transaction” and 
those concerning “the substantive or artistic alteration or 
enhancement of informational materials.” Id. OFAC also 
excluded “intangible items, such as telecommunications 
transmissions,” from the definition of “informational 
materials.” Id. 
                                                                                                     
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2502(b)(1)(C). 
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A divergence in views soon developed with regard to 
how expansively OFAC was required to interpret the Berman 
Amendment. In Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1549-
51 (S.D. Fla. 1989), the District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida discerned from the legislative history of the 
Berman Amendment an “obvious First Amendment 
orientation.” In holding OFAC’s exclusion of original 
artwork from the definition of “informational materials” 
unreasonable, the court determined Congress had amended 
TWEA and IEEPA “to prevent the statute from running afoul 
of the First Amendment.” Id. at 1551-53. Because original 
artwork merits First Amendment protection, the court 
concluded, OFAC could not exclude it from the sweep of 
“informational materials.” In dictum, the court theorized that 
the Berman Amendment “totally exempts from prohibition or 
regulation the import of ideas and information protected by 
the First Amendment.” Id. at 1550 n.10.  
By contrast, in Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 
F. Supp. 1007, 1011-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York concluded OFAC’s 
exclusion of intangibles was consistent with the amendment’s 
“other informational materials” language. Capital Cities had 
purchased the exclusive rights to televise the 1991 Pan 
American Games from Havana, Cuba for $ 8.7 million and 
agreed to remit seventy-five percent of this sum to the host 
organizer of the games. Id. at 1009-10. OFAC informed 
Capital Cities the proposed transaction would not fall within a 
general license provision and that it would not issue a specific 
license so long as the transaction would result in a substantial 
sum being transferred to Cuba. Id. The court found the 
46 
 
Berman Amendment was susceptible of multiple reasonable 
interpretations and found the agency’s interpretation that 
excluded intangibles such as telecommunications worthy of 
deference under Chevron. Id. at 1011. In contrast to the 
Cernuda court, the Capital Cities court found “the legislative 
history reflects, at best, a general purpose to foster the 
exchange of ideas across national borders.” Id.30
In 1994, Congress expanded this limitation on 
executive authority by enacting the Free Trade in Ideas Act. 
Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95a, 50 U.S.C. § 
1702(b)). In part, Congress responded to OFAC’s exclusion 
of intangible materials from the definition of “informational 
materials” by amending IEEPA’s exemption to restrict the 
Executive from regulating transactions concerning 
informational materials “regardless of format or medium of 
transmission.” Id. § 525(c)(1) (amending 50 U.S.C. 
§1702(b)(3)). Congress also added “compact disks, CD 
ROMS, artworks, and news wire feeds” to the nonexclusive 
  
                                              
30 In analyzing Capital Cities’ First Amendment arguments, 
the court noted that “the Berman Amendment is in derogation 
of the Executive’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign 
affairs by the use of embargoes on trade with hostile nations.” 
Id. at 1013. Balancing this constitutional prerogative with the 
First Amendment issues implicated by deference to OFAC’s 
interpretation, the court found OFAC’s narrowing 
interpretation prudentially avoided a separation-of-powers 
problem. Id. 
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litany of enumerated media that could qualify as 
“informational materials.” Id. The House Conference Report 
stated: 
[N]o embargo may prohibit or restrict directly 
or indirectly the import or export of information 
that is protected under the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution. The language was 
explicitly intended, by including the words 
“directly or indirectly,” to have a broad scope. 
However, the Treasury Department has 
narrowly and restrictively interpreted the 
language in ways not originally intended. The 
present amendment is only intended to address 
some of those restrictive interpretations, for 
example limits on the type of information that is 
protected or on the medium or method of 
transmitting the information. 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-482, at 239 (1994), reprinted in 
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 398, 483. Significantly, although 
Congress overrode OFAC’s interpretation to the extent that it 
excluded intangible materials from the definition of 
“informational materials,” it did not disabuse OFAC of its 
belief that it could permissibly regulate “informational 
materials not fully created and in existence at the date of the 
transaction.” That carve-out remained in place and, to date, 
has not been challenged as ultra vires. 
 Before this Court, Amirnazmi relies on Cernuda to 
argue that, because ChemPlan is a product that would merit 
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First Amendment protection, it necessarily falls outside the 
scope of OFAC’s regulatory capabilities. Although it suffused 
its opinion with constitutional considerations, the Cernuda 
court refrained from reaching the merits of the petitioner’s 
First Amendment challenge to the regulations, opting instead 
to rest on “statutory construction and the legislative history of 
the [Berman] [A]mendment.”  720 F. Supp. at 1553. 
Similarly, Amirnazmi stresses he “is not challenging his 
conviction under the IEEPA on First Amendment grounds.” 
Consequently, whether ChemPlan theoretically could qualify 
for First Amendment protection is not the dispositive 
inquiry.31
                                              
31 Amirnazmi endeavors to bring ChemPlan within the ambit 
of First Amendment protection by analogy to two categories 
of speech. First, he argues ChemPlan functionally resembles 
the prescription drug pricing information classified as 
protected by Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976), in that 
it enables consumers to make more educated decisions and 
thus serves the free market system by steering resources to 
their most productive ends. Second, he characterizes 
ChemPlan as “scientific expression” protected under Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973); see also Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 454 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(computer code capable of meriting First Amendment 
protection). Because Amirnazmi has not pursued a First 
Amendment challenge at any stage in this litigation, we need 
not determine whether OFAC’s regulation would pass 
constitutional muster.  
 Instead, we must determine whether OFAC’s 
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interpretation of the “informational materials” exemption 
comports with congressional intent. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843 n.9 (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of 
statutory construction and must reject administrative 
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional 
intent.”).  
 We are satisfied that OFAC’s interpretation of 
IEEPA’s informational-materials exemption is “based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843. With the Berman Amendment and the Free Trade in 
Ideas Act, Congress sought to ensure the robust exchange of 
informational materials would not be unduly inhibited by 
OFAC. When OFAC enacted regulations that Congress 
considered at odds with this overarching purpose, the 
legislature intervened and modified the statutory language to 
rectify OFAC’s perceived missteps. Critically, although 
Congress addressed one facet of OFAC’s 1989 interpretation 
of the informational-materials exemption by stressing in 1994 
that the Executive may not regulate informational materials 
“regardless of format or medium of transmission,” it did not 
counteract the component of that interpretation at issue here. 
Presumably cognizant of OFAC’s narrowing interpretations, 
Congress could have inserted text stipulating that the 
Executive may not regulate informational materials regardless 
of whether fully created and in existence at the date of the 
transactions. Although the legislative history obliquely 
alludes to other ways in which OFAC had interpreted the 
exemption in an unforeseen manner, it chose to “only . . . 
address some of those restrictive interpretations.” See H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 103-482, at 239. “[W]hen Congress is aware 
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of an agency’s interpretation of a statute and takes no action 
to correct it while amending other portions of the statute, it 
may be inferred that the agency’s interpretation is consistent 
with congressional intent.” Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 
F.3d 1441, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing North 
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982)), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Kwai Fun 
Wong v. United States INS, 373 F.3d 952, 972 n.26 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
 Moreover, there is ample evidence to suggest Congress 
has accepted OFAC’s decision to permit the circulation of 
informational materials already in existence while 
concomitantly regulating transactions that contemplate the 
creation of new materials. In the ITR, OFAC has fleshed out 
the scope of the regulatory carve-out by explaining: 
Transactions that are prohibited notwithstanding 
this section include, but are not limited to, 
payment of advances for information and 
informational materials not yet created and 
completed (with the exception of prepaid 
subscriptions for widely circulated magazines 
and other periodical publications), and 
provision of services to market, produce or co-
produce, create or assist in the creation of 
information and informational materials. 
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31 C.F.R. § 560.210(c)(2).32
                                              
32 OFAC’s general interpretation of the informational-
materials exemption, in place when Congress amended the 
informational-materials exemption in 1994, reads:  
 OFAC has made a reasoned 
determination that Congress’s paramount concern for 
facilitating transactions and activities incident to the flow of 
informational materials in-being does not reach goods and 
events that would not be produced but for financing from the 
United States (in the case of imports) or financing from 
purchasers in embargoed countries (in the case of exports). In 
the case of commercial goods, the key distinction rests 
between informational materials that are widely circulated in 
a standardized format and those that are bespoke. Whereas 
OFAC may not regulate the sale or transfer of prefabricated 
[P]rohibited transactions include, without 
limitation, payment of advances for 
informational materials not yet created and 
completed, provision of services to market, 
produce or co-produce, create or assist in the 
creation of informational materials, and 
payment or royalties to a designated national 
with respect to income received for 
enhancements or alterations made by persons 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to 
informational materials imported from a 
designated national. 
54 Fed. Reg. 5229 (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 500.206(c)). 
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or mass-produced informational materials, custom-made 
materials crafted to suit the unique specifications of a 
particular purchaser are not sacrosanct. This distinction is 
sensible, and it reflects a permissible implementation of the 
statutory exemption in light of IEEPA’s competing 
imperatives (i.e. restricting material support for hostile 
regimes while encouraging the robust interchange of 
information).  
At trial, the government adduced sufficient evidence to 
convince a reasonable factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt 
that ChemPlan was not “fully created and in existence” at the 
date of the relevant transactions. Amirnazmi trumpeted the 
software’s dynamism. Joseph Mehl, a computer network 
support technician who provided services to TranTech, 
testified to his belief that each ChemPlan package was 
“specifically tailored to the end user, depending on what 
industry they worked in.” In aggressively pursuing 
commercial ties with NPC, Amirnazmi attempted to stoke his 
counterparty’s interest by proposing several options for 
calibrating the software to NPC’s unique needs. As explained 
below, the sale of ChemPlan to NPC was the cornerstone of 
Amirnazmi’s conspiracy to bring his technical expertise to 
Iran for that country’s aggrandizement. Consequently, the 
transfer of ChemPlan to Iranian purchasers does not fit neatly 
into the paradigm of informational exchange envisioned by 
Congress. Quite clearly, Amirnazmi envisioned ChemPlan as 
being of singular functional utility to Iranian users. Since the 
inception of the informational-materials exemption, OFAC 
has excepted such transactions from the scope of the general 
license.  
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Accordingly, we conclude that 31 C.F.R. § 
560.210(c)(2) is a permissible construction of IEEPA’s 
informational-materials exemption and is worthy of deference 
under Chevron. See 467 U.S. at 843. Therefore, a reasonable 
factfinder could have found the government proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the sale of ChemPlan to Iranian 
purchasers did not qualify for exemption from IEEPA as a 
matter of law. 
B. 
Next, Amirnazmi contends OFAC’s regulations are 
imprecisely drafted and consequently void for vagueness. His 
core argument is that the carve-outs to the informational-
materials exemption fail to provide “clear principles.” 
According to him, it is impossible to determine whether a 
work is “fully created and in existence” without necessarily 
invoking “an untethered subjective judgment.” Again, we find 
Amirnazmi’s argument unconvincing.33
                                              
33 Amirnazmi has challenged all four of his IEEPA 
convictions on the theory that OFAC’s regulations are 
unconstitutionally vague. He argues that the alleged 
vagueness of the informational-materials exemption is 
“exacerbated by the vagueness of other provisions in the 
regulations.” Specifically, he argues that the amorphousness 
of 31 C.F.R. § 560.206(a) allowed the government to convict 
him for engaging “solely in preliminary negotiations with 
Iranian entities.” However, that regulation prohibits “any 
transaction or dealing.” Id. This language flatly proscribes the 
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“A statute is void on vagueness grounds if it: (1) ‘fails 
to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits’; or (2) 
‘authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.’” United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 249 
(3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 
(2000)). In the criminal context, “since vagueness attacks are 
based on lack of notice, ‘they may be overcome in any 
specific case where reasonable persons would know their 
conduct puts [them] at risk’ of punishment under the statute.” 
San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1138 (3d Cir. 
1992) (quoting Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S, 356, 361 
(1988) (alteration in original)). Criminal statutes need only 
give “fair warning that certain conduct is prohibited” to 
survive constitutional challenges. Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that: 
[E]conomic regulation is subject to a less strict 
vagueness test because its subject matter is 
                                                                                                     
conduct for which Amirnazmi was convicted. See United 
States v. Parise, 159 F.3d 790, 797 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that the “plain meaning” of the term “dealings” 
encompassed “all interactions or contacts” that a jury could 
have considered as “proof of the requisite association” 
between a RICO defendant and an illicit enterprise). 
Therefore, we will confine our analysis to the regulatory 
carve-out and Amirnazmi’s ChemPlan-related IEEPA 
convictions. 
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often more narrow, and because businesses, 
which face economic demands to plan behavior 
carefully, can be expected to consult relevant 
legislation in advance of action [and may] 
clarify the meaning of the regulation by [their] 
own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative 
process.  
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). And, significantly, “the Court has 
recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s 
vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice 
to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.” Id. at 499; 
see also United States v. Hescorp, Heavy Equip. Sales Corp., 
801 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A] requirement of 
willfulness makes a vagueness challenge especially difficult 
to sustain. . . . ‘A mind intent upon willful evasion is 
inconsistent with surprised innocence.’” (quoting United 
States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942))). 
The District Court rested its conclusion that the 
regulation is not unconstitutionally vague on two grounds. 
First, it reasoned that the sophisticated nature of those 
required to consult the IEEPA regulations coupled with the 
availability of guidance from OFAC officials on electronic 
and telephone hotlines negated any notice concerns. And 
second, it noted that IEEPA’s scienter requirement counseled 
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against a vagueness finding. See Amirnazmi, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 74833, at *4-8.34
As to the latter point, the government had to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Amirnazmi willfully violated 
the trade restrictions. See 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c) (restricting 
IEEPA convictions to those who “willfully commit[ ], 
willfully attempt[ ] to commit, or willfully conspire[ ] to 
commit” a violation of any license, order or regulation issued 
pursuant to IEEPA); see also id. § 1702(a)(3) (“No person 
shall be held liable in any court for or with respect to 
anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the 
administration of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, this title, 
or any regulation, instruction, or direction issued under this 
title.”). As the District Court noted, “this is a case where 
 
                                              
34 Without explicitly pronouncing on the constitutionality of 
the informational-materials exemption, federal courts have 
uniformly upheld the regulations in the face of vagueness 
challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Soussi, 316 F.3d 1095, 
1101-03 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Quinn, 401 F. 
Supp. 2d 80, 100 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[T]he Iran trade embargo 
laws . . . are not apt to sweep within their coverage the 
everyday acts of average citizens. Rather, they govern the 
activities of relatively sophisticated individuals who are 
deliberately engaged in international commerce and, 
therefore, must be familiar with (if not expert in) various legal 
regimes . . . in multiple countries.”); Anvari-Hamedani, 378 
F. Supp. 2d at 830-31; United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 
2d 541, 573-74 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. Geissler, 
731 F. Supp. 93, 100-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).  
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ignorance of the law is a defense; the inability to appreciate 
the meaning of the law negatives the mens rea required for 
conviction, and Defendant was free to, and did, argue this to 
the jury.” Amirnazmi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74833, at *7 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The jury unanimously 
concluded Amirnazmi knew his conduct was unlawful. 
 And, as to the former point, the record reveals 
Amirnazmi only halfheartedly availed himself of the 
opportunity to receive definitive guidance from OFAC. 
Amirnazmi first contacted OFAC upon his return from Iran 
on June 3, 2008. He indicated he was curious as to whether 
consolidating publicly available documents in a single 
location to increase the ease of access for individuals in Iran 
would fall within the informational-materials exemption, and 
he alluded to the possibility of exporting a good to Iran. He 
did not mention the computations that could be done with the 
data, nor did he ask if confidential trade secrets were exempt. 
On June 10, after FBI and IRS officials had executed the 
search warrant for TranTech, Amirnazmi again contacted the 
OFAC hotline, this time to complain his office had been 
searched, but without making any inquiries about the 
interplay between ChemPlan and the Iranian sanctions. On 
June 11, he sent a letter to OFAC confirming his unsupported 
understanding that ChemPlan fell within the exemption but 
again failed to disclose how ChemPlan functioned as a 
dynamic planning tool. Amirnazmi once more contacted 
OFAC on June 17 and was told to submit a “detailed 
explanation of the transactions he wanted to carry out” if he 
wanted authoritative guidance. One month later, he was 
indicted. The District Court concluded Amirnazmi did not 
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contact OFAC “in good faith or with the intention of actually 
procuring guidance in complying with the OFAC 
regulations.” Amirnazmi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74833, at *6 
n.17. Amirnazmi’s refusal to provide OFAC with the detailed 
information that might have allowed the agency to offer 
reasoned guidance supports the District Court’s conclusion. 
Moreover, OFAC’s interpretive rulings do not cast 
doubt on the ability of reasonable persons to appreciate 
whether their conduct was prohibited. Amirnazmi points to a 
sequence of rulings in which OFAC attempted to demarcate 
the scope of permissible editing of Iranian-authored works to 
be published in the United States. After OFAC ruled on 
September 30, 2003, that “collaboration on and editing of 
manuscripts submitted by persons in Iran, including activities 
such as the reordering of paragraphs or sentences, correction 
of syntax, grammar, and replacement of inappropriate words 
by U.S. persons, prior to publication, may result in a 
substantively altered or enhanced product,” it revisited this 
broad statement after meeting with publishing representatives, 
concluding on April 2, 2004, that “style and copy editing,” 
such as correcting grammar and spelling and reformatting the 
document for publication, was exempt activity. On July 19, 
2004, OFAC addressed how these prior rulings would apply 
to U.S. newspapers seeking to publish Iranian-authored 
articles. It wrote that “substantive edits to the work’s content 
to make the work more cohesive, efficient, argumentative or 
effective . . . and to make the work conform to the 
newspaper’s editorial standards would not constitute 
59 
 
substantive or artistic alteration or enhancement of the article 
or commentary.”35
Although Amirnazmi would read this publishing 
trilogy as indicating the regulations are so convoluted as to 
render them incomprehensible even to those charged with 
administering the sanctions, the salient lesson is that 
representatives of the publishing entities actually met with 
OFAC officials to proactively and candidly discuss how the 
regulations should apply to their line of work.
 
36
                                              
35 On the heels of this series of interpretive rulings, OFAC 
created a general license for transactions “necessary and 
ordinarily incident to publishing.” See 69 Fed. Reg. 75468, 
75471 (Dec. 17, 2004) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 560.538). 
 OFAC, for its 
36 Amirnazmi fails to grapple with other OFAC rulings that 
are arguably more germane to ChemPlan’s status as 
informational material. A February 3, 2003, ruling specified 
that, with respect to the “provision of access to a database, the 
inclusion of an electric [sic] search function that does no 
more than search and sort the exempt information in the 
database is . . . exempt from the prohibitions of the ITR.” It 
further noted that such guidance did “not address any 
additional product that may be offered in connection with the 
use of the database; nor does it apply to technical support, 
customer support, or any other services that might be 
provided.” On December 11, 2003, OFAC distinguished 
between the provision of basic information and the provision 
of services “beyond the mere dissemination of information in-
being.” As explained above in Section IV.A, this line of 
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part, demonstrated its willingness to partake in productive 
consultations with businesses that approached it. If 
Amirnazmi had been perplexed by the applicability of the 
regulations, he had abundant opportunity to obtain 
clarification. See Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498 
(noting that the ability of sophisticated businesses to obtain 
clarification “by resort to an administrative process” provides 
one of the rationales for according economic regulations 
greater latitude upon a review for vagueness).   
In sum, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion 
that, in light of the “narrow subject matter and reach of the 
IEEPA regulations, as well as the sophisticated nature of the 
persons they affect and the ability of such persons to obtain 
guidance from OFAC itself, the IEEPA regulations are not 
unconstitutionally vague.” Amirnazmi, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 74833, at *6.37
                                                                                                     
demarcation encourages the inference that products falling 
within this latter category, such as ChemPlan, would fail to 
find refuge in the exemption.  
 Because OFAC’s regulations are 
37 Amirnazmi’s challenge to the constitutionality of the 
regulations takes the form of a facial challenge. However, the 
Supreme Court has written that a petitioner “who engages in 
some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of 
the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. 
A court should therefore examine the complainant’s conduct 
before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law.” 
Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 (footnote 
omitted). Because Amirnazmi had ample notice that his 
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neither ultra vires nor unconstitutionally vague, we will deny 
Amirnazmi’s request to vacate his IEEPA convictions on 
these grounds. 
V. 
 Finally, Amirnazmi’s appeal requires us to address two 
further issues: (1) whether there was a variance between the 
indictment, which charged Amirnazmi with one continuous 
conspiracy, and the facts established at trial; and (2) whether 
the District Court abused its discretion in admitting tape 
recordings of Amirnazmi’s prison telephone calls. We 
conclude Amirnazmi is not entitled to relief on either of these 
grounds. 
A. 
 Amirnazmi contends there was a variance between the 
indictment and the facts established at trial, and that this 
variance caused evidence to be admitted that would otherwise 
have been barred by the statute of limitations.38
                                                                                                     
conduct was captured by the regulations, his facial vagueness 
challenge, which would be upheld “only if the enactment is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications,” must fail. See 
id. 
 Namely, 
38 We exercise plenary review over claims of variance. United 
States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2006). When, 
however, the petitioner does not raise a claim in a timely 
fashion, our review is for plain error. United States v. 
Williams, 464 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 2006). In the District 
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Court, Amirnazmi moved for a new trial on the ground that 
the court erroneously admitted evidence of conduct that fell 
outside the statute of limitations period on the faulty premise 
that he had engaged in one continuous course of conduct. On 
appeal, he has converted this argument into a claim of 
prejudicial variance. Although both require us to determine 
whether Amirnazmi’s pre-2003 conduct was part of the same 
continuing course of action that precipitated the 2008 
conspiracy charge, the variance claim would allow us to 
undertake a plenary review of the District Court’s decision 
whereas resubmitting the evidentiary claim would constrain 
our review by limiting us to the deferential abuse of 
discretion standard. Whether or not we review Amirnazmi’s 
variance claim de novo or for plain error, he must 
demonstrate that the District Court prejudiced a substantial 
right. See United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 287 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“A conviction must be vacated when (1) there is a 
variance between the indictment and the proof presented at 
trial and (2) the variance prejudices a substantial right of the 
defendant.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases 
added); Williams, 464 F.3d at 445 (“Under the plain error 
standard, before an appellate court can correct an error not 
raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) 
that affect[s] substantial rights.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (alteration in original) (emphases added). Because 
Amirnazmi cannot prove a substantial right was unfairly 
prejudiced, the dispute over the appropriate standard is 
immaterial.  
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Amirnazmi alleges the evidence, “if anything,” proved he 
engaged in two separate conspiracies, one of which 
terminated before the limitations period. The statute of 
limitations for violations of IEEPA is five years. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3282(a) (setting the default statute of limitations for 
non-capital federal offenses). But, because the District Court 
concluded Amirnazmi’s actions dating back to 1997 were part 
of a single, continuous conspiracy, it admitted evidence of 
acts occurring prior to 2003. Amirnazmi contends, as he did 
in his Rule 33 motion, that the introduction of evidence 
relating to his activities outside the limitations period tainted 
his trial.  
“There is a variance if the indictment charges a single 
conspiracy while the evidence presented at trial proves only 
the existence of multiple conspiracies.” United States v. 
Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 287 (3d Cir. 2007). The rule against 
variance “protects the defendant’s right to an indictment 
sufficiently inform[ing] [him] of the charges against him so 
that he may prepare his defense and not be misled or 
surprised at trial.” United States v. Schurr, 775 F.2d 549, 553-
54 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alterations in original). Conspiracy “is a continuing offense 
and a jury may consider each and all of a defendant’s actions 
in furtherance of the conspiracy so long as the indictment is 
brought within five years of the last overt act.” United States 
v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123, 130 n.6 (3d Cir. 2002). “[T]he crucial 
question in determining whether the statute of limitations has 
run is the scope of the conspiratorial agreement, for it is that 
which determines both the duration of the conspiracy, and 
whether the act relied on as an overt act may properly be 
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regarded as in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Grunewald v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 391, 397 (1957). 
The government’s superseding indictment charged 
Amirnazmi with conspiring to violate IEEPA from 1996 
through July 2008 by engaging in transactions with 
companies located in Iran despite knowing such conduct was 
prohibited. When the District Court analyzed Amirnazmi’s 
claim within the statute of limitations context, it defined 
Amirnazmi’s conspiracy as a plot “to bring his technical 
wherewithal, especially the ChemPlan system, back to Iran 
for the benefit of that country.” Amirnazmi, 648 F. Supp. 2d 
at 723. The superseding indictment set forth six pre-2003 
overt acts that allegedly contributed to the advancement of 
this conspiracy, and the court concluded that the evidence 
adduced by the government at trial demonstrated this conduct 
was “closely tied” to his “continuing efforts to sell his 
ChemPlan software to the [NPC].”39
                                              
39 Specifically, the court cited evidence that Amirnazmi (1) 
signed a 1997 agreement with NPC to sell the ChemPlan 
software and traveled to Iran to conduct demonstrations and 
training; (2) sold NPC a ChemPlan update in 1998; (3) helped 
secure the BoxScore software for NPC in 2000; (4) met with 
NPC personnel in Iran in 2000 and subsequently sent NPC 
officials a fax that included a subscription order form and 
other ChemPlan materials and which suggested the formation 
of a joint venture; (5) attended the same conference in 2001 
and sent a letter to NPC with an offer for a ChemPlan 
program that would be designed to meet its ends; (6) sent a 
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The District Court concluded Amirnazmi had 
“resolved on achieving certain goals for the betterment of 
Iran” prior to 2003 and that, although he failed to make 
significant headway until well later, “there is no evidence that 
[he] ever abandoned or renounced” the plan he had hatched in 
the late 1990s. Id. After his encounter with President 
Ahmadinejad in 2006, Amirnazmi’s efforts began to bear 
fruit. He successfully negotiated another licensing agreement 
with NPC in 2008 (after representing that the 1997 agreement 
was still valid), and he signed memoranda of understanding 
with IBACO and NITD. In the court’s estimation, 
Amirnazmi’s efforts to sell ChemPlan to NPC were integral 
to his goal of turning Iran into a “chemical powerhouse.” 
Thus, it concluded, Amirnazmi’s pre-2003 acts fell squarely 
within the scope of his conspiracy to bolster Iran’s chemical 
capacities, and evidence of these acts was properly presented 
to the jury on the theory that they contributed to a continuing 
course of conduct. Id. 
Amirnazmi now offers two alternative arguments: (1) 
the government failed to prove his pre-2003 conduct was part 
of any conspiracy, and (2) even if his early sales to the NPC 
were part of a conspiracy to violate IEEPA, that purported 
                                                                                                     
second letter discussing the 2001 conference and urging NPC 
to contact him with respect to the proposed joint venture; and 
(7) attempted to drum up business in 2002 with his 
unsuccessful attempt to have brochures printed in Iran for his 
software. Amirnazmi, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 722. 
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conspiracy terminated “well before the subsequent 2008 sale 
of ChemPlan.”  
The gravamen of Amirnazmi’s contention that his pre-
2003 conduct was not conspiratorial in any way is that the 
government failed to demonstrate the existence of an 
agreement to violate the statute. See United States v. Gebbie, 
294 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2002) (listing “an agreement 
between two or more persons” as an essential element of a 
conspiracy charge under 18 U.S.C. § 371). Amirnazmi claims 
the government failed to demonstrate he shared a common 
enterprise with NPC “beyond occasionally buying and selling 
computer software.” He attempts to divorce his pre-2003 acts 
from the overriding contextual narrative and style them as 
intermittent transactions between a buyer and a seller working 
at arms’ length and without any nefarious joint objective. 
However, Amirnazmi declines to confront the evidence that 
demonstrates he worked in conjunction with various officials 
to provide ChemPlan and BoxScore and had ongoing, regular 
contact with assorted NPC agents. The jury may reasonably 
infer these business relationships would not have persisted 
without at least an understanding in place between the parties 
that Amirnazmi would be willing to provide goods and 
services in violation of the embargo. See United States v. 
McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 326 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding that a 
reasonable jury could infer from the totality of the evidence 
“that the activities of the participants . . . could not have been 
carried on except as the result of a preconceived scheme or 
common understanding” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alteration in original)). 
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And Amirnazmi’s alternative contention—that, at best, 
the government proved the existence of two separate 
conspiracies—is similarly unpersuasive. It miscasts his 
unrequited efforts to spark renewed interest in ChemPlan 
prior to 2006 as evidence the conspiracy could not have been 
“continuing.” This slackening may reveal a disparity in the 
vigor with which each side pursued the object of the 
conspiracy; NPC seems to have been a somewhat reluctant 
collaborator for most of the early part of the past decade. 
Nevertheless, the resumption of concerted activity in 2007 
came on the heels of Amirnazmi’s continuous efforts to 
preserve and strengthen TranTech’s Iranian ties. The 
temporary lull in sales does not detract from the District 
Court’s conclusion that Amirnazmi’s later actions were part 
of the same conspiracy that had begun in the 1990s. 
Amirnazmi’s recurrent efforts to strengthen the relationship 
were sandwiched between two periods of concerted activity 
in which the parties pursued the same unlawful end. The 
unaltered nature of the parties’ interests both prior to and after 
2003 belies Amirnazmi’s depiction of the facts as evidencing 
one conspiracy ceasing and another commencing. 
Amirnazmi would have to demonstrate that, even if a 
variance led to evidence being admitted that otherwise would 
have been barred by the statute of limitations, such evidence 
prejudiced a substantial right. As noted, this holds true 
whether we conduct a plenary review or review for plain 
error. “An error affects substantial rights when it is 
prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district 
court proceedings.” United States v. Vazquez-Lebron, 582 
F.3d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
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omitted). Here, it appears as though Amirnazmi’s variance 
argument is targeted primarily, if not exclusively, at his 
conviction for conspiracy in Count One. Because limiting the 
jury’s consideration to evidence of Amirnazmi’s post-2006 
activities would not have resulted in a different outcome, 
Amirnazmi cannot demonstrate his substantial rights were 
prejudiced by introduction of this evidence. 
Because the District Court neither misinterpreted the 
law of conspiracy nor prejudiced a substantial right of 
Amirnazmi’s, it did not err in admitting evidence of 
Amirnazmi’s pre-2003 conduct. 
B. 
Lastly, Amirnazmi appeals the District Court’s 
decision to allow the government to introduce into evidence 
tape recordings and translated transcripts of telephone calls 
placed by Amirnazmi to certain family members during his 
pretrial imprisonment at the Federal Detention Center 
(FDC).40
                                              
40 We review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude 
evidence, “if premised on a permissible view of the law,” for 
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 
402 (3d Cir. 1996). Amirnazmi initially challenged the tape 
recordings under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. 
The District Court rejected this argument in its Feb. 6, 2009 
Order admitting the tapes, and Amirnazmi declined to renew 
this objection in either his Rule 33 motion or in the briefing 
materials he has submitted in support of his current appeal. 
 Amirnazmi argues the government violated Fed. R. 
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Crim. P. 17(c) by impermissibly using subpoenas as 
discovery devices. Rule 17(c), which governs the issuance of 
subpoenas duces tecum in federal criminal proceedings, is 
“not intended to provide a means of discovery for criminal 
cases.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 698 (1974), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Bourjaily 
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 177-79 (1987); see also 
United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 
1980). Rather, the rule was designed “to expedite [a] trial by 
providing a time and place before trial for the inspection of 
the subpoenaed materials.” Bowman Dairy Co. v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951). Notably, the Rule 17(c) test 
outlined in Nixon pertains to the production of documents in 
advance of trial. 418 U.S. at 698-700.  
Here, the government served a series of trial subpoenas 
on the FDC’s Custodian of Records requiring him to appear 
on a specified date and to bring with him copies of 
Amirnazmi’s telephonic communications aside from those 
shielded by attorney-client privilege. Critically, the dates 
returnable of the subpoenas paralleled the then-scheduled trial 
dates and noted that the witness was “subject to call.” 
Because the subpoenas did not require pre-trial production, 
the District Court concluded Nixon was not controlling and 
the government had not run afoul of Rule 17(c). Amirnazmi, 
however, argues the government implicitly understood that 
the FDC would expedite its production of the requested 
evidence. That is, based on the alacrity with which the FDC 
habitually responds to subpoenas received from the United 
States Attorney’s Office, Amirnazmi believes the government 
anticipated the FDC turning around the subpoenas in short 
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order and consequently having access to the communications 
well in advance of trial. Thus, he argues the protections 
embodied in Nixon against the misuse of pre-trial subpoenas 
should apply notwithstanding the formal returnable dates on 
the subpoenas. 
Although the District Court rejected Amirnazmi’s 
invitation to adopt a broad reading of Rule 17(c) both at the 
suppression hearing and in its denial of his Rule 33 motion, 
Amirnazmi again seeks a ruling that Nixon’s gloss on Rule 
17(c) applies with equal force to trial subpoenas likely to 
yield pre-trial production. Amirnazmi discerns support in 
United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1494 (S.D. Fla. 
1991), for the broad proposition that trial subpoenas may not 
be used to procure advance production of a defendant’s 
prison-recorded conversations without first obtaining leave of 
court. Significantly, in Noriega, the subpoenas directed the 
custodian of records to appear and testify on various dates, 
none of which corresponded with scheduled hearings in the 
case. Id. at 1482. Because no proceedings were scheduled on 
the dates indicated in the subpoenas, the court found it 
unmistakable that the subpoenas “constituted a broad 
dragnet” designed to “enable the prosecution to examine 
these recordings prior to trial in order to obtain additional 
discovery against the defendant.” Id. at 1492-93. 
Additionally, the court noted that subpoenas are more likely 
to be used for impermissible discovery purposes “when 
advance production of materials is sought instead of the usual 
production at time of trial or other proceeding in which they 
are to be used in evidence.” Id. at 1493.  
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Here, the government issued subpoenas that complied 
with the facial requirements of trial subpoenas. On other 
facts, such formalistic compliance may be insufficient to 
mask the government’s efforts to make an end run around 
Nixon. However, the record before us does not demonstrate 
such an impermissible discovery motive. We therefore 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the recordings as evidence.41
                                              
41 Furthermore, Amirnazmi claims the trial was tainted by the 
admission of these telephone recordings but does not explain 
how the result would have been different were they to have 
been excluded. As the District Court astutely noted, 
 
The probative value of these tape recordings 
lies in their value as evidence of Defendant’s 
state of mind. Yet, the jury was presented with a 
plethora of other evidence from which 
Defendant’s state of mind could be determined, 
including Defendant’s repeated contradictory 
statements about his business dealings in Iran, 
and the multiple times he was put on notice of 
the restrictions on trade with Iran. Therefore, 
even assuming the Court erred in admitting 
these tape recordings, such error would not have 
had a substantial impact on the verdict and 
would not warrant a new trial. 
648 F. Supp. 2d at 720 n.18. 
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VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the jury’s 
verdict and the District Court’s imposition of a four-year 
prison sentence. 
